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• Credit default swaps (CDSs) continue to be controversial, with concern that trades in them drive prices 
of government debt down. 
• Evidence from the CDS spread for one country—Ireland—indicates that its CDS spread has been 
reacting to news about developments in Ireland, Greece, and the European Union. 
• This examination of Ireland’s CDS spreads is consistent with the proposition that the spreads reflect 
fundamental developments, not mindless speculation. 
 
 
Concerns about the debt of some European countries are in the news again in September 2010. At 
the same time, spreads on government debt have increased to levels near recent highs, never having 
returned completely to precrisis levels. 
Spreads on government debt narrowed for  
a time after Greece received substantial 
financial aid, cut government spending, and 
raised taxes. 
Figure 1 shows the levels of spreads on credit 
default swaps (CDSs) for selected European 
governments’ debt. The figure includes two 
countries with relatively low spreads, Germany 
and the United Kingdom, and four countries 
with higher spreads—Portugal, Ireland, 
Greece, and Spain (PIGS). These four countries 
have substantial economic difficulties and 
government deficits, with no clear roadmap to 
sustainable government deficits. As a result, the long-term resolutions of their current deficit situa-
tions are in doubt.  
 
Credit default swaps and risk 
Credit default swaps are a commonly used measure of risk assessments on government debt. The 
spreads in Figure 1 are for five-year contracts on CDSs with the spreads measured in basis points 
(hundredths of a percent). Similar to an insurance contract, buyers of a CDS pay for insurance 
against a credit event on the underlying government debt. For the Greek five-year CDS, the insur-
ance premium is the annual insurance payment relative to the amount of debt. For example, a 
spread of 1,000 basis points implies that the buyer pays an insurance premium of 10 percent per 
year of the value of the securities. The seller of the credit default swap receives the premiums and 
pays out if a credit event happens.  
A credit event occurs when there is a substantial, identifiable loss. Credit events applicable to 
governments are failure to pay on the debt or restructuring of the debt. Generally speaking, a 
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restructuring involves reduced payments or payments that are spread over time without compensa-
tion.1 The occurrence of a credit event gives the insured the right to deliver certain government 
securities to the seller; and the seller of the insurance has the obligation to pay the face value of the 
debt, instead of the lower market value, to the insured.  
These CDS spreads can be interpreted as a measure of the perceived risk that a government will 
restructure or default on its debt. CDS spreads in August 2010 suggest that the perceived probability 
of the Greek government restructuring or defaulting is substantially higher than it was even as 
recently as August 2009. The direction of relative changes can be inferred from the spreads, although 
the magnitude of the implied probability of a restructuring or default cannot be inferred without 
substantial detail on the underlying CDS contract.  
 
Do CDSs reflect risk or something else? 
A major concern recently has been whether CDS spreads on government debt reflect assessments of 
the probability of restructuring or default or instead represent “speculative attacks” with little or no 
basis in the governments’ situations.2 On September 15, 2010, the European Commission adopted a 
proposal for regulating short selling and certain aspects of credit default swaps.3 As the March 2010 
Notes from the Vault points out, there are similarities between short selling stocks that one does not 
own and buying CDSs on bonds that one does not own. Among other things, these positions are ones 
in which investors gain from adverse developments in the underlying security, and the positions are 
thought by some to contribute to decreases in prices in the underlying assets. For example, CDSs are 
thought to contribute to decreases in prices of government debt (European Commission 2010).  
The European Commission proposal has two parts. The first part calls for continuous provision of 
information about positions to regulators. The second part permits financial regulators to restrict 
CDS transactions for up to three months in distressed markets. The reason given for these 
restrictions is to stop “negative price spirals” in government bonds stemming from CDS trading 
(European Commission 2010). 
Have CDSs contributed to decreases in prices of sovereign debt? No doubt this question will be 
examined in the research literature for some time to come. Without waiting for decades of research, 
it is possible to explore an answer to a simpler question: Do CDS spreads change in ways that are 
consistent with events at the time?  
It might seem most natural to examine Greek CDS spreads since they are most in the news 
recently, but we think it is more interesting to look at another of the affected countries, Ireland. 
Irish spreads have been affected by developments concerning the Irish government’s own finances 
and by developments concerning Greece. The experiences concerning Irish spreads make it clear 
whether developments concerning Greece have substantially affected other countries’ spreads, an 
interesting issue in itself.  
 
                                                            
1 Bedford, Penalver, and Salmon (2005, Box 1 and Box 2) summarize restructuring of sovereign debt and the econom-
ics of those restructurings. 
2 It is little mentioned, but CDS contracts on government debt are denominated in other countries’ currencies. For 
example, CDS contracts on countries in the euro area are denominated in dollars. As a result, CDS spreads reflect 
exchange rates. This fact has not been particularly important, at least for Europe and the United States. 
3 Details are available at the European Commission’s website. 
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Irish credit default swaps 
Before the Irish government’s guarantee of all liabilities of the six largest Irish banks on September 
29, 2008, the maximum spreads were 17 basis points in 2007 and 34.5 basis points in 2008. After this 
guarantee, a big change occurred in the spread. From the date of the guarantee through August 31, 
2010, the spread has never been lower than 60 basis points and has been as high as 396 basis points. 
This change in the spread between these two periods is hardly surprising given the extraordinary 
demands on the Irish Treasury. The Irish government budget has been hard hit by the government’s 
guarantee of all of Irish banks’ debt, the dramatic decrease in Irish government revenue that fol-
lowed the Irish housing-price crash, and the increase in government expenditure caused by the 
recession (Connor, Flavin, and O’Kelly 2010).  
Figure 2 shows changes in the spread on Irish debt. A few days stand out with extraordinary 
changes. In addition, there are periods with large changes—up and down—and periods with 
smaller changes.  
The largest single movement in the CDS 
spread on Irish debt was on May 10, 2010, 
when the spread fell 78 basis points. This 
fall occurred on the Monday after the 
weekend when the European Union’s 
finance ministers agreed to assist Greece if 
requested to do so. As would be expected, 
the effect on Greece’s CDS spread was 
bigger; it decreased by 362 basis points—
from 939 basis points to 577 basis points.  
The next-biggest movement in Irish 
spreads was an increase in the spread by 
55 basis points on February 12, 2009. This 
increase came the day after two developments: First, the Irish government unveiled a new bank 
bailout plan. Second, the public learned that Anglo Irish Bank’s balance sheet had been inflated by 
a 7 billion euro loan by Anglo Irish whose apparent purpose was to create a deposit in Anglo Irish. 
This increase in the spread was followed on the next day by the third-biggest increase of 49 basis 
points. The fourth-biggest increase was more than a year later, on April 27, 2010, a day in the 
period of heightened concern about Greece, as evidenced by an increase in Greece’s spread from 
364 basis points on April 12 to 824 basis points on April 27. On Friday, April 23, Greece requested 
actual aid from the European Union and from the International Monetary Fund. On April 27, 
Standard & Poor’s cut Greece’s debt rating to junk and lowered Portugal’s debt rating by two 
grades, downgrades that may have increased concerns about Ireland’s debt rating. 
These large changes in spreads were related to news at the time. While this analysis cannot 
indicate whether the changes were too large, too small, or just the right size, it does show that the 
changes are not random or thoughtless. In addition, it indicates that Ireland’s spread has been 
affected substantially by developments that concern Greece or other countries directly and Ireland 
indirectly. 
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Another way of explaining the changes in CDS spreads is to examine whether the changes in the 
volatility of the spread in Figure 2 are consistent with other developments. Large changes were 
evident in early 2009 and again from late April 2010 up to the end of the data. Early 2009 was a 
period of developments concerning the Irish government’s guarantee of bank liabilities and the 
effects on the government’s finances. While Irish banks’ debt and repeated capital injections into 
Anglo Irish Bank by the government continue to raise questions about the Irish government’s 
ability to pay on its debt, the news in 2010 before September was dominated by stories about 
Greece and responses by the European Union and the International Monetary Fund. These 
developments have affected Ireland’s CDS spread. 
Figure 3, which shows all days with movements of the Irish spread by 20 basis points or more, 
illustrates the importance of joint developments in 2010. The first movement was on September 30, 
2008, at the height of the financial crisis and 
the day after the Irish government’s guaran-
tee of the banks’ liabilities. After making that 
guarantee until the middle of 2009, large 
changes for Ireland’s spread are prominent 
amid no such changes for other countries. The 
pattern has been the opposite in 2010. From 
February 9, 2010 onward, there is only one 
day in which Ireland is the only one of the 
PIGS to have a change of 20 basis points or 
more. Instead, there have been common 
developments affecting Ireland’s spread and 
the spread of one or more of the other PIGS 
countries—Greece, Portugal, and Spain. The 
earlier period of high volatility in Ireland’s 
CDS spread is associated with Irish developments, and the later period is associated with 
developments affecting Ireland, Greece, Portugal, and Spain.  
 
Conclusion 
Spreads on credit default swaps for some countries’ sovereign debt have increased recently. Given 
the terms of CDS contracts, this increase in the spreads can be interpreted as a reflection of 
heightened concern about countries having difficulty making the promised payments. On the other 
hand, the increase in spreads could simply reflect mindless speculation on these countries’ debt.  
A review of the Irish CDS spread indicates that CDS spreads have been reacting to news—about 
both Ireland and the European Union. Large changes in the Irish spread in late 2008 and in early 
2009 reflected Irish developments, but later changes before September 2010 were associated with 
European Union developments. The Irish spread has been sensitive to news concerning Ireland and 
to news concerning Greece and the European Union’s responses to the Greek government’s 
difficulties. 
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